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Creditor Moral Hazard in Equity Markets:  
A Theoretical Framework and Evidence from Indonesia and Korea  
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT  
 
This paper expands on the work of Sarno and Taylor (1999) and develops three alternative 
models in which creditor moral hazard might occur in equity markets under different 
assumptions regarding the existence of asset market bubbles and implicit guarantees. 
Incorporating IMF-related news associated with the own country and with other countries to our 
models, we are able to predict the expected change in investor behavior and its effect on stock 
returns. Using daily stock returns for Indonesia and Korea, we test the ability of the models to 
predict the expected changes in stock returns on the days of IMF-related news such as program 
negotiations and program approval. Our results regarding Korea and, to a lesser extent, Indonesia 
are consistent with the creditor moral hazard models that assume implicit guarantees and asset 
price bubbles. Our results show that, if there is creditor moral hazard in equity markets, its 
duration could be measured only by days, suggesting that creditor moral hazard is a short-term 
phenomenon.  
 
1.  Introduction 
1 
The fact that the IMF provided financial support to Mexico in 1995 preceded financial 
crises in South East Asia (1997), Russia (1998), and Brazil (1998) has led to the contention that 
IMF support implies moral hazard in financial markets. Friedman (1998) argued that the IMF’s 
support to Mexico “… encouraged individuals and financial institutions to lend to and invest in 
the East Asian countries, drawn by high domestic interest rates and returns on investment, and 
reassured about currency risk by the belief that the IMF would bail them out if the unexpected 
happened and the exchange pegs broke.” Therefore, creditor moral hazard is the hypothesis that 
the expected Fund-support of a country may provide an implicit guarantee to the country’s 
creditors regarding their returns, which motivates investors to take excessive risks (Edwards, 
1998; Eichengreen, 2000; Feldstein, 1998; Friedman, 1998; Schultz et al., 1998; Schwartz, 
1998).  
  Initial empirical studies concerning creditor moral hazard emerged in the late 1990s, and 
since then the interest in quantifying this type of moral hazard has been increasing. This paper’s 
motivation is based on the fact that the majority of studies have focused on creditor moral hazard 
associated with sovereign bonds.
2 So far, to our best knowledge, Sarno and Taylor (1999) offer 
the very first tests of creditor moral hazard in equity markets. Their paper represents the most 
comprehensive empirical study on the subject. In contrast to other papers that only examine 
bonds, their study includes portfolio (equity and bonds), commercial bank, official, and FDI 
flows to emerging markets.  Their approach to testing for creditor moral hazard is based on the 
question of whether various types of financial flows have a significant temporary (reversible) 
component.   
Sarno and Taylor’s (1999) results indicate that official flows tend to have a large, 
permanent component. Among private flows, FDI flows have the largest permanent component, 
and therefore are highly irreversible. Commercial bank credits seem to have a large permanent 
component as well. However, portfolio flows to East Asian countries, except for Australia and 
Japan, have a large temporary component. A high degree of portfolio flow reversibility coupled 
with their additional finding that stock prices and dividends are not cointegrated (interpreted as 
                                                 
1 We thank Ales Bulir, Bernd Hayo, Gary Santoni, and Myles Wallace for their helpful comments on the previous 
version of this paper. All errors are ours.  
2 See Evrensel and Kutan (2004) for a review of papers on creditor moral hazard regarding bond markets.    
stock market bubbles) persuades Sarno and Taylor (1999) that their results regarding portfolio 
flows are consistent with the moral hazard interpretation of the East Asian crisis.  
Even though Sarno and Taylor (1999) provide a comprehensive coverage of different 
types of capital flows, they state that their evidence provides only a necessary condition. Their 
paper therefore provides a weak and indirect evidence of creditor moral hazard. Our paper 
extends Sarno and Taylor (1999) in several directions. First, we develop models of investor 
behavior under alternative assumptions of asset bubbles and implicit guarantees in which creditor 
moral hazard may take place. We incorporate Sarno and Taylor’s (1999) findings regarding 
reversibility of equity flows and asset market bubbles in our theoretical framework. Second, we 
provide an empirical assessment of the theoretical model, using data from Indonesia and Korea. 
Third, in addition to actual program periods, our estimations employ IMF-related news such as 
announcement of negotiations and approval of programs, which may be more appropriate for 
moral hazard considerations. Fourth, we allow for sequential creditor moral hazard effects by 
allowing IMF news from other countries to affect local equity markets. Finally, instead of 
employing data on monthly aggregate stock prices, as in Sarno and Taylor (1999), we use daily 
data. This issue is important, because moral hazard effects may not last for a long time. Indeed, 
our results show that, if there is creditor moral hazard in equity markets, its duration could be 
measured only by days, which implies that creditor moral hazard can be best described as a 
short-term phenomenon. 
  The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical framework in which 
creditor moral hazard in equity markets is examined. Section 3 provides the results of the 
empirical analysis. Section 4 provides concluding remarks.  
 
2.  Theoretical Framework Regarding Creditor Moral Hazard in Equity Markets   
Sarno and Taylor (1999) point out two characteristics of equity markets. First, in 
emerging markets (including our sample countries, Indonesia and South Korea), stock prices and 
dividends are not cointegrated, which they interpret as a sign of asset price bubbles. Second, 
equity flows have a large temporary component, which makes them highly reversible. While 
Sarno and Taylor (1999) conclude that the coexistence of asset price bubbles and reversibility of 
equity flows represent the necessary conditions for creditor moral hazard in equity markets, they 
do not study the sufficient conditions. The argument regarding the highly reversible nature of  
equity flows is more intuitive, because one needs to have fast-acting investors, if they are 
supposed to enjoy higher returns as a result of IMF-related news. The argument regarding 
bubbles in equity markets, however, is not clear. How would asset price bubbles secure 
excessive returns to the holders of equities in the event of an IMF program?  
In the following, we develop a framework in which IMF-related news may create creditor 
moral hazard in emerging equity markets. Our framework includes assumptions regarding 
general investor behavior and their response to IMF-related news in equity markets with and 
without bubbles. The mechanics of creditor moral hazard and the role of IMF programs are 
explicitly examined. 
As to the general investor behavior, there is a wide variety of assumptions: rational 
behavior, limited rational behavior, noise traders, contagion, etc.
3 We assume rational agents and 
relate rationality to agents’ ability to use all available information at any point in time. This 
implies that investors revise their current information set and subsequently their decision as more 
information becomes available. We rule out “mimetic contagion” suggested by Topol (1991) and 
assume that an investor’s decision does not contain any information to another investor.
4 This 
enables us to explain the nature of creditor moral hazard based on a representative agent model. 
Even if asset price bubbles exist, they are assumed to be rational bubbles in the sense that the 
moments of the equity price are independently determined, as long as mimetic contagion does 
not occur (Topol, 1991).
5  
  Now we turn to the discussion of IMF-related news and IMF programs. With respect to 
IMF-related news, we consider two types of news: announcement of IMF program negotiations 
and program approval. Additionally, investors expect that, once IMF programs start, they would 
have particular effects on program countries’ economic performance and asset markets. Investors 
                                                 
3 Noise traders who react in concert to non-fundamental signals are thought to influence equilibrium asset prices. 
Because price deviations from fundamentals created by changes in investor sentiment are unpredictable, noise 
traders introduce a systematic risk that is priced. See French, Schwert, and Stambaugh (1987), De Long, Shleifer, 
Summers, and Waldmann (1990), Brauer (1993), Brown (1999), and Lee at al. (2002) for theoretical and empirical 
treatment of noise traders. 
4 Topol’s (1991) model assumes that an investor sets his bid or ask price according to an additive learning process. 
On the one hand, he adjusts his prices to his present value calculated from an incomplete information set. On the 
other hand, to capture some information held by the other investors, he also adjusts his prices to average prices of 
his nearest buyers and sellers, which implies “mimetic contagion.”   
5 If agents have imperfect information and mimetic contagion exists, this creates a speculative bubble through 
correlations of the agents’ behavior. In this case, mean and variance of asset prices are simultaneously determined, 
which implies that it is no longer possible to explain the asset price dynamics based on one agent’s statistical 
properties. The representative agent hypothesis becomes invalid (Topol, 1991).      
may assume that, once the start of program negotiations with a country is announced, the 
probability of an IMF program adoption in this country is close to unity, because it is fairly rare 
that the IMF decides not to provide a program to a country. However, investors do not know 
about the size of the program loan till the program approval is announced. Hence, there may be a 
period of uncertainty regarding the size of the loan until the program announcement. We 
therefore include a “window” variable in our estimations to capture such uncertainty. It covers 
the period from the initial announcement of negotiations until the day before the program 
approval. During this time period, the attitude of prospective country’s government towards IMF 
program or its degree of cooperation with the IMF may influence investors’ expectations 
regarding the future success of IMF programs and, therefore, equity market returns.    
 Investors’  expectations  regarding a country’s economic performance during the IMF 
program duration are important as well. If they expect a credible program implementation in the 
future, this would lead to higher returns in asset markets today. However, investors’ expectations 
may also be affected by economic performance during earlier programs. Knowing that GDP 
growth rates generally decline during program years (Evrensel, 2002; Prezeworski and Vreeland, 
2000), investors may expect a slower economy in the program country during the 
implementation of an IMF program.  
  In addition to countries’ own IMF-related news, we use IMF-related news in other 
countries. The sequential moral hazard argument was introduced in the late 1990s by economists, 
who suspected creditor moral hazard in other countries when a country receives IMF support 
(Edwards, 1998; Eichengreen, 2000; Feldstein, 1998; Friedman, 1998; Schultz et al., 1998; 
Schwartz, 1998). They implicitly argued that IMF programs provided to other emerging 
countries represent an additional piece of information for investors to recalculate the probability 
of an IMF program in another emerging country. Because previous studies do not offer an 
explicit discussion regarding the mechanism of sequential moral hazard, we address this issue as 
well.  
  In the following, building on our discussion of investor behavior and IMF-related news 
above, we develop three alternative creditor moral hazard models under various assumptions of 
asset market bubbles and implicit guarantees. Model 1 assumes the presence of asset market 
bubbles without any implicit guarantees. Model 2 allows for implicit guarantees but excludes 
asset market bubbles, while Model 3 assumes asset market bubbles with implicit guarantees. One  
goal of this discussion is to show that creditor moral hazard can occur even without asset market 
bubbles. 
 
Model 1: Asset market bubbles without implicit guarantees    
  In the absence of implicit guarantees provided by the IMF through emerging countries’ 
governments to equity holders, one can describe the nature of creditor moral hazard in equity 
markets based on investors’ expectations regarding the duration of the bubble in a country. Our 
hypothesis is that, if there are bubbles in emerging countries’ asset markets, in the absence of 
implicit guarantees, IMF-related news may contain information regarding the timing of a burst in 
the bubble.  
  In order to create an environment in which creditor moral hazard could take place, 
suppose that Country A’s equity market experiences asset price bubbles. The duration of the 
current bubble may be determined based on the size and duration of previous bubbles. Investors 
are assumed to make some probabilistic statements regarding the end of the bubble and 
associated expected excess returns until the bubble would burst. If investors believe that IMF-
supported stabilization programs signal macroeconomic and financial problems in program 
countries, we expect a downward trend in economic activity, including equity markets, during 
the implementation of the program. An expected IMF-program in Country A hence may start the 
countdown for the burst. 
  Investors’ calculation of the present value of expected excess returns depends upon the 
duration of the bubble, which is based on the information set on previous bubbles,Φ.  Consider      
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where  t R  is expected excess return to Country A’s equity market at time t, conditional on the 
information set Φ. For simplicity, we assume that R implies the profit-maximizing excess 
returns, adjusted for the exchange rate risk. Time is index as t = 0, 1, 2, …, m where m marks the 
end of the bubble, and the return associated with this particular time period is negative. It is  
assumed that other returns in (1) are positive and  i t t R R + 〈  as long as  m i < ≤ 0 .  i γ  is the 
probability with which  i t R + will be observed and ∑ =
m
i
1
1 γ . ( ) δ + 1  is the discount factor.  
  Suppose that the information set Φ associated with Country A’s asset markets is revised 
to  Φ′ because of IMF-related news in Country A. If, based on the revised information set Φ′, 
investors expect an IMF-program in Country A, they may conclude that the bubble previously 
thought to last m periods with some probability will burst in period k with certainty, where  m k〈 .  
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Based on Equation (2), if investors sell their stocks in period k-1, which is the period before the 
bubble bursts in period k with certainty, the present value of their excess returns will be higher 
than that suggested in Equation (1).  
  We assume that two types of IMF-related news may contain signals regarding the 
duration of asset market bubbles. News can be either a country’s own IMF-related news or, 
based on the sequential moral hazard hypothesis, it may reflect another country’s IMF-related 
news. Based on revised market views initiated by the IMF-related news in Country B (say, 
Thailand), investors may conclude that Country A (say, Indonesia) would be the next country to 
receive an IMF program. News that Country B would be receiving an IMF program may 
motivate investors to revise their stand on equity markets in general and on Country A’s equity 
markets in particular. Assuming that IMF-related news contains information regarding the 
duration of asset market bubbles, we expect the following changes in equity returns:  
(i) Country’s own news: Because IMF programs constitute a sign of external imbalances and may 
signal an expected burst in asset bubbles, we expect that the announcement of program 
negotiations in country B decreases equity returns in this market. During the window period, 
which covers the period between the announcement of negotiations and program approval, the 
change in returns may depend upon investors’ interpretation of the relationship between the IMF 
and the prospective program country. A highly publicized negative relationship, which may 
signal, among other things, fewer funds from the IMF and the government’s lack of commitment 
toward the credible implementation of the prospective program, is expected to decrease returns. 
Cooperation between the IMF and the prospective program country, however, is expected to  
affect returns positively. Changes in returns due to the announcement of program approval 
depend upon whether a surprise is associated with program approval. In other words, we expect 
that the changes in returns during the window to continue on the day of the approval 
announcement, if there are no surprises as to the content or the size of the IMF program. While 
negative surprises are expected to decrease returns on the day of program approval, positive 
surprises are expected to increase them. In the absence of a surprise, we expect no changes in 
asset returns upon the announcement of program approval.   
(ii) Other country’s news: If IMF-related news in Country B motivates investors to conclude that 
Country A will receive IMF support in the near future, investors would want to enjoy the bubble 
in Country A until it bursts following Country A’s own IMF-related news. Therefore, 
negotiations in Country B may increase returns in Country A’s equity markets due to increased 
buying activity of Country A’s equities. Changes in returns in Country A during the window and 
on the day of program approval in Country B may depend upon several factors. Everything else 
constant, if investors interpret the relationship between the IMF and Country B as problematic, 
we expect higher returns in Country A, because investors would start buying Country A’s 
equities. However, positive news regarding Country B may be associated with lower returns in 
Country A.  
(iii) Own program duration: As mentioned before, empirical studies suggest that, on average, 
program countries’ growth rates decline during an IMF program. Considering the fact that 
programs last more than a year and asset markets react to news and expected changes in the 
overall economy immediately, the overall change in stock returns during an IMF programs may 
not be statistically significant.
6  
 
Model 2: Implicit guarantees without asset market bubbles  
  Even though there are no explicit guarantees provided by the IMF or program countries’ 
governments to investors holding these countries’ equities, implicit guarantees could be provided 
by the prospective program country’s government. The IMF’s financial support is supposed to 
stop the temporary loss of international reserves in a country and therefore provide additional 
liquidity to the economy. The recipient government is expected to use the Fund’s financial 
                                                 
6 Because we expect this to be true under all models, we do not report our expectations associated with program 
duration when discussion the remaining two models.     
support to finance necessary fiscal and monetary policies so that macroeconomic inconsistencies 
that led to the reserve loss can be eliminated. However, money is fungible, and funds obtained 
from the IMF may be partly or overwhelmingly used to pay off lenders. As Lane and Phillips 
(2000) suggest, financial support provided by the IMF is not large enough to provide guarantees 
on every lender’s return. Still, the government may decide which lender will receive his returns 
without any payment problems, if the government had to choose among them.     
  Even though the nature of the implicit guarantee with respect to some lenders, such as 
commercial banks, holders of sovereign bonds, etc., is considerably more straightforward, it is 
not obvious with respect to equity holders. Creditor moral hazard in equity markets would exist, 
if the government or its officials have ties to certain interest groups and therefore some funds are 
expected to be used for these business groups in the form of subsidies, government credits, etc.
7 
In this case, we expect the following changes in equity returns associated with IMF-related news.       
  
(i) Country’s own news: We expect that the announcement of program negotiations will increase 
returns on equities, if the government is known to protect certain groups and it is likely to receive 
an IMF program. Again, during the window, the change in returns may depend upon investors’ 
interpretation of the relationship between the IMF and the prospective program country. While a 
negative relationship with the IMF may signal fewer funds, a decline in support level for 
protected groups or a positive cooperation between the IMF and the prospective program country 
is expected to affect returns positively. The effect of program approval on returns depends upon 
whether there is a surprise associated with program approval. For example, if funds associated 
with the program are smaller than expected, this may decrease the returns.  
                                                 
7 In East Asian countries studied in this paper, there is a highly-publicized relationship between the government and 
business, which suggests the distribution of public funds by the government among certain groups. Even though the 
nature of this distribution may be different in each country, it leads to an inefficient distribution of resources in all of 
them. In Thailand, the nature of the relationship seems to be more political in the sense that the government provides 
funds to the groups that are politically valuable to them. For example, considering the fact that peasants constitute 
the majority of the voters, following the 1997 crisis, the government approved a large sum of funds to all 70,000 
peasant villages and a three-year moratorium on interest payments by indebted farmers. In Indonesia, the 
relationship-based distribution of public funds seems to be more prevalent. It is well known that sectors such as 
steel, petrochemicals, and real estate receive large funds and enjoy various protective measures. During the crisis, 
the members of the president’s family had a monopoly on cloves, owned banks, and even started to develop a 
national car and aircraft business. In Korea, as a development strategy, the government has tried to pick winners in 
manufacturing and technology, and provided them subsidized credits, looser domestic and foreign borrowing 
restrictions, and protection from foreign competition.    
(ii)  Other country’s news: Negotiation news associated with Country B and investors’ 
expectations that Country A will be the next country to receive an IMF program may motivate 
investors to buy Country A’s equities. Therefore, negotiations in Country B are expected to 
increase returns in Country A’s equity markets. Changes in equity returns in Country A during 
the window and on the day of program approval in Country B depend upon several factors. 
Everything else constant, if investors interpret the relationship between the IMF and the 
prospective program country as problematic, we expect higher returns in Country A, because 
investors would buy Country A’s equities. Positive surprises on the day of program approval in 
Country B may be associated with lower returns in Country A.  
 
Model 3: Asset market bubbles with implicit guarantees  
  In the presence of asset market bubbles and implicit guarantees, IMF related news would 
not signal the end of the bubble, but rather it would signal that it may even last longer due to 
expected IMF funding. In this case, we expect the same changes in equity returns as indicated in 
the previous model (Model 2).     
  At this point, it is important to point out the difficulty with which creditor moral hazard 
in equity markets can be distinguished from investors’ response to any news, in this case, IMF-
related news. Clearly news plays an important role in asset markets, and the fact that investors 
respond to news does not verify the existence of moral hazard. For example, one can question 
why Model 1 (asset price bubbles without implicit guarantees) implies creditor moral hazard, and 
not usual investor response to news. Even if there is an implicit guarantee, the reliability of this 
guarantee may be questionable. Additionally, foreign and domestic investors may think 
differently regarding the reliability of the implicit guarantee.   
The above framework implies the following characteristics of creditor moral hazard in 
equity markets. First of all, portfolio flows imply fast movements of capital. If there is creditor 
moral hazard in equity markets, it may therefore exist during a relatively shorter periods of time. 
This is consistent with the evidence of highly reversible stock returns found in Sarno and Taylor 
(1999). However, because they use monthly data, higher frequency data may be required to 
capture the likely shorter nature of creditor moral hazard behavior. Second, in the absence of 
explicit guarantees, which Sarno and Taylor (1999) do not include in their analysis, only a 
subsection of investors who are willing to invest in high-risk and high-return equities in  
emerging markets and that interpret IMF-related news in the aforementioned fashion would 
enjoy excess returns. Therefore, we would not expect a systematic and statistically significant 
creditor moral hazard formation in equity markets.  
In the next section, we provide empirical evidence to see which model is better supported 
by the data, using Indonesia and Korean equity markets as a case study. Although data are 
available for Thailand, it is not included here as the dependent variable due to the (sequential) 
nature of our empirical framework, as it was the first country in the East Asian crisis. However, 
Thai news is included in daily stock return models for Indonesia and Korea.  
 
3.  Empirical analysis  
We employ daily stock indices of Indonesia and Korea, which are obtained from 
Thomson Financial. The sample period runs from January 6, 1992 through December 27, 2002. 
Returns are computed using log-differenced data, multiplied by 100. We do not limit our sample 
period to the crisis period to better capture the data generating process for stock returns and also 
to account for the impact of Fund program durations on returns.  
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics associated with stock returns for the sample 
period. Average returns are higher for the Korean returns. However, the range (minimum and 
maximum) of returns is larger for the Indonesian data. Korean returns have a larger standard 
deviation (risk), which is consistent with the higher average returns in Korea. The figures for the 
kurtosis indicate the non-normality of the returns, which is confirmed by the large values of the 
Jarque-Bera test statistics.  
Table 2 reports the dates of program negotiations and approvals, along with the duration 
of programs. The results of the empirical analysis are shown in Table 3. For each country’s 
return equations, we have included a number of lagged dependent variables as necessary to 
remove serial correlation in stock returns. Significant ARCH effects observed in initial OLS 
estimates motivated us to employ maximum likelihood GARCH models. To best capture these 
effects, we experimented with standard GARCH as well as asymmetric threshold and 
exponential GARCH models. We found that the standard GARCH(1,1) model fits the data much 
better and it therefore is used in the rest of our estimations. Given the non-normality of stock 
returns in Table 1, all GARCH estimations employ the Bollerslev-Wooldridge standard errors.   
  In Table 3, we use the variable “window” to capture the uncertainty about the outcome of 
negotiations until the program announcement. This dummy variable takes a value of 1 from the 
day after the negotiations announcement until the day before the program announcement. In 
addition, we include dummy variables for the announcements of program negotiations and 
approval. These variables take a value of 1 at the day that negotiations begin (“negotiations”) and 
the day in which program approval is announced for each country (“approval”), respectively. 
Similarly, we construct a dummy variable to capture the impact of the program duration on 
returns. 
Now, we turn to our results regarding the relationship between stock returns and IMF-
related news. Unless indicated otherwise, reported results are statistically significant. We first 
report the results for Indonesia. The announcement of Thai negotiations decreases returns by 
about 0.61 percent. The Indonesian stock returns continue to decline during the Thai window and 
by 1.2  percent. The news about the Thai program approval does not have any statistically 
significant changes on the Indonesian returns. Overall, the results do not support the sequential 
moral hazard hypothesis that would have produced higher stock returns in Indonesia due to IMF-
related news in Thailand under all the three models constructed.  
When we consider Indonesia’s own IMF-related news, stock returns increase by 1.56 
percent on the day of the announcement regarding program negotiations. This result is consistent 
with Models 2 and 3 that assume implicit guarantees. The stock returns decline during the 
Indonesian window period by 2.12 percent. Additionally, the change in Indonesian stock returns 
on the day of the program approval is not statistically significant. The results regarding the 
window and program approval may reflect the problematic relationship between the IMF and 
Indonesia. Growing political and social instability and well-publicized corruption in this country 
likely created uncertainty regarding the ownership and implementation of IMF programs, 
causing lower returns during the window period. At the same time, there was so much regional 
concern during this time period that, in addition to the U.S. and the EU, regional powers such as 
Japan and Australia intervened into the IMF-Indonesia relations. As to the duration, changes in 
stock returns during the Indonesian IMF program are not statistically significant. Considering the 
fact that Table 1 indicates the mean stock return in Indonesia to be 0.013 percent, it is clear that 
the impact of IMF announcements on asset returns was considerable during the crisis period.  
The results regarding Korea are richer, because they capture the impact of not only Thai 
but also Indonesian news. With respect to the sequential moral hazard hypothesis, our results 
indicate that negotiations and program approval in Thailand increase stock returns in Korea by 
1.13 and 0.98 percent, respectively. This result is consistent with the moral hazard predictions of 
all three models. Whether there are bubbles or implicit guarantees in equity markets, higher 
returns are expected in a country due to IMF-related news in another country. With respect to the 
effects of Indonesian IMF-related news on Korean returns, while program negotiations decrease 
stock returns by 3.7 percent, program approval increases them by 2.1 percent. The result 
regarding negotiations is not consistent with our moral hazard expectations and can be explained 
by the problematic relations between the IMF and Indonesia or the social and political turmoil 
then in Indonesia. In fact, during the Thai and Indonesian window, we do not observe a 
statistically significant change in the Korean stock returns.  
  Regarding Korea’s own IMF-related announcements, the announcement of program 
negotiations and approval increase the stock returns by about 6.0 and 7.0 percent, respectively. 
Higher stock returns on the day of the negotiation announcement are consistent with the creditor 
moral hazard models, assuming implicit guarantees with or without bubbles (Models 2 and 3). 
However, the Korean window is associated with a 2.8 percent decline in stock returns. Declining 
returns during the window may be an indication of difficulties or uncertainty during the 
negotiations. As in the case of Indonesia, changes in Korean returns during the IMF program 
duration are not statistically significant.  
Finally, the results for the conditional variance equation indicate that the volatility of 
stock returns increased during the IMF program both in Indonesia and Korea. This result, when it 
is combined with the finding in the mean equation that changes in stock returns are not 
statistically significant during the IMF programs, suggests that program duration does not affect 
investor wealth, but simply raises market volatility. Additionally, the reported Q and Q
2 tests 
statistics indicate that the estimated GARCH(1,1) models do not suffer from additional serial 
correlation and accounts for all time-varying volatility up to 10 lags, respectively. We also 
attempted to include IMF news in the variance equation; however, the results were not reliable in 
the sense that we were not able to get convergence in our estimations.  
    To summarize our results, changes in stock returns associated with IMF-related news 
imply the following. First, regarding the sequential moral hazard hypothesis, increases in returns  
associated with the announcement of other countries’ negotiations are consistent with the 
expectations of all three models. We observe this result only in the case of Korea with respect to 
the Thai and Indonesian negotiation news. Second, considering the countries’ own IMF-related 
news, the impact of negotiations and approval news are generally consistent with our implicit 
guarantee models (Models 2 and 3). Both in Indonesia and Korea, most IMF-related own news is 
associated with higher returns. Third, stock returns either decline during the window or remain 
unchanged, which is not consistent with creditor moral hazard. Fourth, changes in stock returns 
are not statistically significant during an IMF program.
8   
    Overall, our results show that, if there is creditor moral hazard in equity markets, its 
duration could be measured only by days for two reasons. First, the initial increase in returns on 
the day of the negotiation announcement does not continue during the window period. Second, 
significantly higher returns are not observed during the program. This finding implies that 
creditor moral hazard, if it exists, is a short-term phenomenon.  
  Additionally, the fact that the Korean results may be more consistent with our moral hazard 
framework indicates that the sequential occurrence of currency crises in South East Asia in a 
couple of months may imply confidence building or learning about IMF behavior. As the last 
country in the timeline to enter a crisis, investors, by the time the Korean negotiations started, 
could have been more confident that the IMF would provide considerable amount of financial 
support to Korea to prevent further problems in the region and the spread of the crisis to other 
emerging markets. 
  
4. Conclusions and suggestions for further research 
  This paper expands on the work of Sarno and Taylor (1999) and develops three 
alternative models of creditor moral hazard in equity markets under different assumptions of 
asset market bubbles and implicit guarantees. Incorporating IMF-related news associated with 
the own country and with other countries to the models, we are able to predict the expected 
change in investor behavior and its effects on stock returns. Using daily stock returns for 
Indonesia and Korea, we test the ability of the models to predict the expected changes in stock 
                                                 
8 Even though not reported, our results regarding Thailand do not imply creditor moral hazard. Thai stock returns 
either declined or remained unchanged on the days of IMF-related news and during the window.   
returns on the days of program negotiations and loan approval, as well during the duration of the 
programs.  
    Our results regarding Korea and, to a lesser extent, Indonesia are consistent with the 
creditor moral hazard models that assume implicit guarantees and asset price bubbles. We find 
that IMF-related news associated with Thailand and Indonesia, which received IMF support prior 
to the Korean crisis, increased Korean stock returns. Additionally, Korea’s own IMF-related 
news, both the announcement of negotiations and approval, increased Korean stock returns. The 
stronger evidence of creditor moral hazard for Korea may reflect some learning behavior as the 
IMF support to Korea marked the end of the crisis period in Southeast Asia. Within a couple of 
months, three countries (Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea) experienced financial crises. Having 
the ability to process available information fast and, therefore, to move fast, rational investors 
may have figured out the patterns of IMF behavior, revised their expectations accordingly, and 
used them for the Korean stock market. Our findings also suggest that creditor moral hazard 
effects may last only for a short time in equity markets as rational investors react to news 
quickly. 
    We believe that our approach constitutes an improvement over earlier studies, because it 
uses the news approach in a systematic way. One can argue that our results have an alternative, 
non-moral hazard interpretation. In other words, our results may just indicate market reactions 
and asset substitution among various emerging markets. Future research that incorporates other 
countries, episodes, and forward-looking markets will enhance our understanding of creditor 
moral hazard in stock markets. For example, an investigation into forward foreign exchange 
markets would capture investors’ expectations in the absence of an IMF program, which is the 
basic challenge to any creditor moral hazard study. Future research should develop frameworks 
that are able to distinguish between usual investor behavior whose characteristic is to respond to 
the news and investor behavior that implies moral hazard.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics on the Indonesian and Korean stock returns 
 
 Indonesia  Korea 
 
Mean  
 
.01307 .01697 
Maximum 
 
14.1689 11.3353 
Minimum 
 
-13.9306 -12.6943 
Standard deviation 
 
1.7981 2.1785 
Skewness 
 
.1557 .1113 
Kurtosis 
 
12.1839 6.4817 
Jarque-Bera 10076.69 
(.0000)
1 
1452.45 
(.0000) 
Observations  
 
2864 
Sample period 
 
01/06/1992 – 12/27/2002 
 
1 Numbers in parenthesis are p values.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 2: Dates associated with IMF-related news and program duration 
1 
 
 Thailand   
 
Indonesia Korea 
Announcements associated with IMF programs 
2  
 
Start of negotiations 
 
08/05/97 10/08/97 11/21/97 
Program approval 
 
08/20/97 11/05/97 12/04/97 
Program duration 
3 
 
Effective date 
 
08/20/97 11/05/97 12/04/97 
Expiration date 
 
06/19/00 11/04/00 12/03/00 
 
1 The term “program” implies standby arrangements.  
2 Dates associated with IMF-related announcements are based on Lane and Phillips (2000).  
3 Annual Report of the IMF in 1998 and 1999 provides the duration information. Effective and 
expiration dates imply the start and the end of a program respectively.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 3: GARCH estimations of daily stock returns in Indonesia and Korea 
 
 
 
Indonesia 
 
Korea 
 
Constant  
 
.0419 
(.0416) 
1 
.0051 
(.8695) 
Thailand  
negotiations 
2 
-.6064 
(.0000) 
1.1398 
(.0000) 
Window- 
Thailand 
 
-1.2013 
(.0439) 
.0741 
(.8225) 
Thailand  
approval 
-1.2477 
(.6821) 
.9876 
(.0000) 
Indonesia  
negotiations 
1.5643 
(.0000) 
-3.7454 
(.0000) 
Window- 
Indonesia 
 
-2.1221 
(.0971) 
-.3129 
(.7172) 
Indonesia  
approval  
.2337 
(.1925) 
2.1019 
(.0000) 
Korea  
negotiations  
 6.0153 
(.0000) 
Window- 
Korea 
 -2.8422 
(.0753) 
Korea  
approval   
 7.0871 
(.0000) 
Program  
Duration 
 
-.1099 
(.1832) 
.0554 
(.6219) 
Return (-1) 
 
.1687 
(.0000) 
.0632 
(.0018) 
Return (-2) 
 
.0374 
(.1209) 
 
Return (-3) 
 
.0349 
(.1142) 
 
Return (-4) 
 
-.0476 
(.0263) 
 
Variance equation 
Constant 
 
.0698 
(.0008) 
.0597 
(.0013) 
ARCH(1) 
 
.1539 
(.0000) 
.0753 
(.0000) 
GARCH(1) 
 
.8074 
(.0000) 
.9028 
(.0000) 
Program  
Duration 
 
.3818 
(.0026) 
.2337 
(.0197) 
Diagnostic tests  
Log likelihood 
Q(10) 
 
Q
2(10) 
 
-5021.317 
11.313 
(.3342) 
5.4636 
(.8581) 
-5863.263 
7.0144 
(.7242) 
7.741 
(.6541) 
 
1 Numbers in parenthesis are p values.  
2 See Table 2 for the dates associated with IMF-related news and program duration.    DAVIDSON INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER SERIES - Most Recent Papers
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